PARTIES DISPUTE APPLYING “OTHER INSURANCE”

410_C202


PARTIES DISPUTE APPLYING “OTHER INSURANCE”


Automobile

Other Insurance

Uninsured Motorist

 

On November 1, 2003, Cletus Ganschow was a passenger in a vehicle owned by Susan Messer and driven by Samantha Kinser when the vehicle was involved in an accident with Louis Pipito III. Pipito was allegedly negligent and was also an uninsured motorist. Ganschow sought uninsured motorist coverage for his injuries from his parents' insurer, Citizens Insurance Company, as well as Messer's insurer, Standard Mutual Insurance Company.

The Standard Mutual policy had uninsured motorist coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. The Citizens policy had uninsured motorist coverage limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. Both policies contained "other insurance" provisions. Standard Mutual's provision stated: "With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under part IV shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance."

This provision went on to state: "Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance."

The Citizens Insurance "other insurance" provision stated: "1. Any recovery for damages for 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' sustained by an 'insured' may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limit for any one vehicle under this insurance or any other insurance. 2. Any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 3. We will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits."

Ganschow filed a complaint against both Standard Mutual and Citizens. Conceding that because of antistacking provisions his uninsured motorist benefits could not exceed $100,000, Ganschow claimed he was entitled to benefits under both policies. Standard Mutual sought a declaratory judgment clarifying the coordination of coverage between Standard Mutual and Citizens. Standard Mutual argued that the insurers' responsibilities were to be calculated on a pro rata basis. Citizens responded by arguing that Standard Mutual carried the primary coverage and that Citizens carried only excess coverage.

The trial court found that both companies provided primary coverage with respect to Ganschow's uninsured motorist claims. It agreed with Standard Mutual and prorated the claims. According to the court, a maximum of $66,666.67 was to be paid by Standard Mutual, and a maximum of $33,333.33 was to be paid by Citizens. Citizens appealed.

On appeal, Citizens continued to claim that Standard Mutual's coverage was primary. Standard Mutual argued that the insurers' "other insurance" provisions conflicted and should therefore be declared "mutually repugnant." As such, argued Standard Mutual, the provisions should be disregarded, and the insurers should be liable for their respective prorated amounts.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana disagreed with Standard Mutual's "mutually repugnant" argument. According to the court, the pro rata provision of Standard Mutual's "other insurance" clause applied only where "similar" insurance was available. Citizens' "other insurance" clause was triggered by the fulfillment of a specific condition--the ownership of a vehicle that was involved in the accident. Because Citizens' clause was satisfied and Standard Mutual's was not, the respective provisions could be "harmonized." They were, therefore, not "mutually repugnant." Standard Mutual was the primary insurer, and Citizens was the excess insurer. The court concluded that the trial court had erred in granting Standard's Mutual motion to prorate the uninsured motorist coverage between the two companies.

The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Citizens Insurance.

Citizens Insurance Company vs. Ganschow-No. 18A02-0604-CV-312-Court of Appeals of Indiana-January 12, 2007-859 North Eastern Reporter 2d 786